Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2021

Trademark Enforcement and Statutory Incentives
Leah Chan Grinvald

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

5. Grinvald ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

4/9/2022 11:08 AM

TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT
AND STATUTORY INCENTIVES
LEAH CHAN GRINVALD
ABSTRACT
The combination of the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Romag
Fasteners v. Fossil Group, Inc., and the diamond anniversary of the
Lanham Act provides good grounds to reflect on how trademark
enforcement and statutory incentives have evolved through the years.
Although enforcement of one’s trademarks through the use of the courts
can be traced back to England in the 1790s, trademark litigation and
other enforcement activities have exploded, in relative terms, since the
enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946. Although not subject to an easy
empirical correlation, this trend suggests that the statute has had an
impact on increasing the incentives to enforce one’s trademark. This
Article examines this evolution, attempting to highlight which changes
could be providing increased incentives to trademark owners to
aggressively enforce—and in some cases, over-enforce—their marks.
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INTRODUCTION
Although trademark law long predates the Lanham Act, it is the
passage of the Lanham Act that scholars and commentators typically
mark as the beginning of “modern” trademark law.1 Prior to the Lanham
Act, federal trademark legislation was fairly narrow.2 For example, under
the 1905 Act, trademarks were limited to those affixed to goods (as
opposed to “service” marks), and enforcement was limited to where such
registered trademarks were used on unauthorized goods of the “same
descriptive properties.”3 In 1946, the Lanham Act (the “Act”)
dramatically broadened the scope of federal trademark law, purporting to
reflect the “legitimate present-day business practice.”4 Trademarks had
in fact become more utilized in a post-World War II era, when travel and
trade in goods and services across the United States were more easily
conducted.5 In addition, the adoption of the Lanham Act reflected the
growing rise in “consumerism” and the promotion of the consumer as a
“patriot.”6
In the seventy-five years since the passage of the Act, it has been
amended numerous times, with major amendments further expanding the
protection of trademarks.7 During these same seventy-five years, there
has also been a dramatic rise in trademark infringement enforcement.8
Although an empirical correlation is difficult to prove, it could be argued
that the expansion of trademark law through the Act and its later
amendments has had an impact on incentivizing enforcement of
trademark rights.9 Given this, some of the concerns over the antiSee, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1687 (1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 373–
78 (1999).
2 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1840 (2007).
3 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728, repealed by Lanham Act, ch. 540,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946).
4 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 5 (1946); see McKenna, supra note 2, at 1902.
5 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
585, 596–97 (2008).
6 See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC 7 (2003); The Rise of American Consumerism,
PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/tupperwareconsumer/ [https://perma.cc/3GVN-V6P3] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
7 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 5:5–5:11, Westlaw (5th ed., database updated Mar. 2021).
8 In this Article, the term “trademark enforcement” is used to broadly encompass informal
enforcement, such as cease-and-desist letters, as well as formal efforts such as filed federal lawsuits,
or oppositions or cancellations brought at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).
However, there are no statistics for informal enforcement efforts, such as cease-and-desist letters.
For statistics that show the growth of formal enforcement efforts, see Port, supra note 5, at 612
(showing a graph of total number of reported cases per year since 1947); TTAB Incoming Filings
and Performance Measures for Decisions, Fiscal Year 2021, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/ttab/ttab-incoming-filings-and-performance [https://perma.cc
/BN5E-CQ6M] (last modified Jan. 5, 2021, 1:38 PM).
9 In addition, the American economy has grown considerably since 1946, fueled in large part by
consumerism. See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. Given this, it should perhaps
1
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competitive nature of trademark protection that were raised before and
after the passage of the Act have arguably come to fruition.10 In recent
years, large and well-resourced entities have wielded the power of
trademark enforcement in an attempt to attain complete control over their
marks.11 These entities have claimed that parodies,12 artistic uses,13
critical reviews,14 as well as uses in far-flung product categories15 are
infringing their trademarks.
The harm from this over-enforcement is broad and impacts society
on different levels, from having an anti-competitive effect, to raising
barriers for new businesses to enter markets, all the way to chilling free
speech.16 More alarmingly, though, is that much of these overenforcement activities are conducted extra-judicially—very few of these
enforcement efforts see the light of a courtroom.17 This means that large
entities are able to enforce their claims of trademark infringement against
less resourced entities without the benefit of judicial oversight to halt

be unsurprising that with more consumer products on the market, there would be a rise in trademark
enforcement. While an increase in enforcement efforts, in and of itself, is not necessarily a negative
phenomenon, this Article draws a distinction between reasonable enforcement efforts and bullying.
The expansions in trademark law over the last seventy-five years have allowed, and in some aspects
encouraged, an apparent increase in wrongful behavior.
10 See Lunney, supra note 1, at 367–71 (describing the commentary); Lemley, supra note 1, at
1688–89 (describing Professor Ralph Brown’s criticisms of trademark law).
11 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 (1990) (“[T]he changing legal climate has tended
to grant trademark owners ever greater control over their marks . . . .”).
12 See Mark A. Lemley, Fame, Parody, and Policing in Trademark Law, 2019 MICH. STATE L.
REV. 1, 1 (2019) (“Trademark owners regularly overreach. They often threaten or sue people they
have no business suing, including satirists, parodists, non-commercial users, and gripe sites.”);
William McGeveran, The Imaginary Trademark Parody Crisis (and the Real One), 90 WASH. L.
REV. 713, 715 (2015) (“While there are few litigated cases, markholders routinely send cease-anddesist letters demanding the eradication of parodies aimed at their trademarks.”); Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 484 (2013)
(“Increasingly, . . . we’ve witnessed a new phenomenon: lawsuits against parodies that serve as
brands, logos, or taglines for commercial products.”).
13 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Cosmopolitanism, 47 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 875, 877–88
(2014) (describing enforcement efforts by Louis Vuitton against Nadia Plesner, a Danish art
student).
14 See Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 400, 417–18
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (discussing cases).
15 See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-t-shirts-challenged-by-chick-fila.html [https://perma.cc/HJU5-SHDH] (describing fast-food chain Chick-fil-A’s trademark
enforcement efforts against entrepreneur, Bo Muller-Moore, and his T-shirt line of “Eat More
Kale”); I’m 2-0 Against Chick Fil A!, EAT MORE KALE (Dec. 13, 2014), https://eatmorekale.com
/im-2-0-chick-fil/ [https://perma.cc/XG3Y-FUWL] (blog post by Mr. Muller-Moore announcing
his trademark registration issuing).
16 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Charitable Trademarks, 50 AKRON L. REV. 817, 832 (2017) (harms in
the non-profit sector from trademark over-enforcement and bullying by charitable entities); Leah
Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 629 (economic harms)
[hereinafter Grinvald, Shaming]; Katyal, supra note 13, at 902 (harms to free speech); Dreyfuss,
supra note 11, at 401 (harms to free speech); Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2003) (harms to commercial speech).
17 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 488.
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more egregious or abusive claims.18 Where enforcement crosses the line
into trademark bullying, the target of such bullying has little recourse.19
This Article argues that there are at least three types of expansions
of the Lanham Act in the past seventy-five years that have led to an
“incentivization” of overly broad trademark enforcement: (1) the
expansion in what is considered actionable confusion through the
adoption of the Lanham Act; (2) the expansion in the scope of protectable
trademarks through judicial interpretation; and (3) the heightened
importance of having a “famous” mark through the adoption of federal
trademark dilution law. Combined, these expansions in trademark law
have created a cost-benefit analysis for trademark owners that
incentivizes enforcement. In addition, this Article argues that the recent
U.S. Supreme Court case of Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.20 and
its interpretation of the Lanham Act’s provision of defendant’s profits has
the potential to further incentivize enforcement, and possibly even
trademark bullying.
I. BACKGROUND OF PRE-LANHAM ACT TRADEMARK LAW
Pre-1946, or “traditional,” trademark law was a fairly narrow body
of law, focused on protecting what was termed “technical” marks.21
“Technical” marks were those that were used only on goods and were
limited to the marks that are now termed as “inherently distinctive.”22
These were marks that were not descriptive of the underlying goods, were
not someone’s name, and were not terms related to the area from which
the goods came (a geographical name or term).23 Marks that had these
qualities were known as “trade names” and were protected under general
unfair competition law.24 For example, the term “MCDONALD’S” for
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 412
(2015).
19 See generally Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 16 (discussing the lack of tools available for a
trademark bullying target).
20 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020).
21 See Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in
Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 869 n.33 (2002).
A number of eminent scholars have written about the origins of English and American trademark
law. Part I is necessarily a simplified overview. For in-depth coverage, see Lionel Bently, From
Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property,
in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, supra note 14, at 3–41; McKenna, supra note 2; Robert G.
Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 547 (2006); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV.
731, 736–46 (2003); Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An
Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505 (1998);
FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS
(1925).
22 Compare Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 725, with Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
23 Trade-Mark Act of 1905 § 5.
24 The exception to this was the “Ten Year Clause,” under which marks that had been in use from
at least 1895 could be registered under the 1905 Act. See HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
18
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the hamburger restaurant chain owned by the McDonald brothers would
have been considered a trade name, whereas “IVORY” for a bar of soap
was a technical trademark.
The focus of the pre-1946 trademark law was narrow. In his
influential article, Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, Professor
Mark McKenna provides an in-depth analysis of early English and
American trademark law cases that supports the conclusion that the
primary goal of traditional trademark law was to protect against diverted
trade.25 Situating trademark law within nineteenth-century natural
property rights theory, Professor McKenna persuasively concludes that
“[t]raditional trademark protection . . . focused on producers’ attempts to
steal away customers from those in close competitive proximity.”26
The import of this narrow realm for trademark law is that
enforcement of one’s trademark could justifiably be brought only against
direct competitors or counterfeiters. One influential case in the preLanham Act years of the twentieth century underscored this: in Borden
Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., the plaintiff, a wellknown dairy producer, sued the defendant for attempting to use its name
on commercial ice cream products.27 However, at the time of the lawsuit,
the original Borden’s had only made a limited form of “malted” ice cream
sold to hospitals.28 Even though the company claimed that it planned to
sell ice cream more broadly, it had not yet done so.29 The Seventh Circuit
declined to impose an injunction against the defendant because without
its own commercial ice cream, the defendant could not divert competition
away from the plaintiff.30
However, in the years leading up to the drafting of the Lanham Act,
a broader scope of trademark law was being developed by some courts.31
These courts were loosening the direct competition requirement to allow
some plaintiffs to succeed in enforcement efforts against related goods.
For example, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit in Borden Ice Cream, the
Second Circuit in Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co. found
trademark infringement even where the plaintiff and defendant were not

COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 43 (2d ed. 1917).
25 McKenna, supra note 2.
26 Id. at 1899.
27 Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
28 Id. at 512.
29 Id. at 514.
30 Id. (“There being no competition between the appellants and appellee, we are confronted with
the proposition that the appellee, in order to succeed on this appeal, has and can enforce a
proprietary right to the name ‘Borden’ in any kind of business, to the exclusion of all the world.”).
31 See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:5 (discussing two influential cases, Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co. and Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson).
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direct competitors.32 In this case, the plaintiff produced pancake batter,
whereas the defendant produced pancake syrup. The court stated,
But we think that goods, though different, may be so related as to fall
within the mischief which equity should prevent. Syrup and flour are
both food products, and food products commonly used together.
Obviously the public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a
syrup, would conclude that i[t] was made by the complainant.33

Of the two, this broader concept of trademark law would eventually
win out over the Seventh Circuit’s more narrow approach with the
adoption of the new federal trademark law, as will be discussed in the
next part.
II. ADOPTION OF THE LANHAM ACT AND EXPANSIVE TRADEMARK LAW
While the proponents of the Act vociferously argued that the new
trademark law focused on simply protecting against unfair competition,34
at least two provisions were notable departures from the prior 1905 Act.35
First, the Act allowed for registration of a broader range of trademarks—
not only could marks that were inherently distinctive be registered but
also those that had “acquired” distinctiveness.36 The Lanham Act allowed
both trademarks and service marks37 to be registered, thus eliminating
any legal differences between a “technical” trademark and a trade name.
The impact of this was to significantly widen the subject matter that could
be protected as a trademark. Trademarks that would not have previously
qualified for trademark protection could now be registered.38
Based on this significant shift, since 1946, courts have had the
ability to interpret the Lanham Act as not limiting the subject matter over
which a trademark could be claimed.39 Consider trademarks consisting of

Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
Id. at 409–10.
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of
reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those
who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed.”).
35 See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1902 (discussing the deletion of the direct competition
requirement).
36 Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 2(f), 60 Stat. 427, 429 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2018))
(“Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, nothing herein
shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce.”).
37 Id. § 3 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2018)) (“[S]ervice marks shall be registrable, in the same
manner and with the same effect as are trademarks, and when registered they shall be entitled to
the protection provided . . . in the case of trademarks.”).
38 See Lunney, supra note 1, at 375.
39 For a further discussion of the problems associated with broader subject matter, see Lisa P.
Ramsey, Protectable Trademark Subject Matter in Common Law Countries and the Problem with
Flexibility, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TRADEMARK
LAW 193, 203–08 (Irene Calboli & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2020).
32
33
34
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a single color.40 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co.,41 color was not universally considered an
appropriate subject matter of a trademark.42 The Seventh and the Ninth
Circuits had held that color was never protectable, whereas the Federal
and the Eighth Circuits had held that color was per se protectable. 43 In
addition, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) allowed colors to
be registered as trademarks.44
However, in Qualitex, the Supreme Court resolved the split in the
law in favor of a broader scope of protection. Qualitex concerned a
dispute over the green-gold color for a laundry press pad. The plaintiff,
Qualitex, had been using the color as a mark.45 In 1990, Qualitex sued a
competitor, Jacobson, for using the same green-gold color for its laundry
press pads.46 During the pendency of the trial, Qualitex’s registration for
the green-gold color was granted by the PTO.47 Although the district
court held that Qualitex’s color trademark had been infringed, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the ruling with respect to the validity of the color as a
trademark.48
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by focusing on the
statutory language in the Lanham Act:
The language of the Lanham Act describes th[e] universe [of things
that can qualify as a trademark] in the broadest of terms. . . . Since
human beings might use as a “symbol” or “device” almost anything at
all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is
not restrictive.49

See id. Other examples are restaurant design and other forms of trade dress. See generally Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
41 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
42 See, e.g., A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171
(1906) (“[A] trade-mark which may be infringed by a streak of any color, however applied, is
manifestly too broad.”); James Heddon’s Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 F.2d 6, 9
(6th Cir. 1942) (“Color, except in connection with some definite, arbitrary symbol or in association
with some characteristics which serve to distinguish the article as made or sold by a particular
person is not subject to trademark monopoly.”).
43 Compare NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that color
alone should not be granted trademark protection as trade dress), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991),
and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), with Master
Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 221 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no rule
prohibiting trademark protection of color by itself), and In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774
F.2d 1116, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that pink for fiberglass could be protected as a trademark
per se).
44 See Paul R. Morico, Protecting Color Per Se in the Wake of Qualitex v. Jacobson, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 571, 571 (1995).
45 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., No. 2:90-cv-01183, 1991 WL 318798, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 3, 1991).
46 Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1300.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1301, 1305.
49 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
40
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Although the Supreme Court stopped short of holding that colors
could be deemed to be “inherently distinctive,” and proof was needed that
consumers perceived it as a trademark, Qualitex increased the scope of
trademark protection.50
The second provision in the 1946 Act that was also a significant
departure from traditional trademark law was the ability to claim
infringement for related goods, not just similar goods. In effect, the Act
adopted a scope of protection that was expounded in the Aunt Jemima
Mills case. A side-by-side comparison of the prior trademark law, the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, and the enacted provision in the 1946 Act
reveals this significant shift. Section 16 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905
provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner thereof,
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any such trademark
and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties as those set forth in the registration, . . . shall
be liable to an action for damages therefor at the suit of the owner
thereof . . . .51

Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, provides:
Any person who shall, in commerce, use, without the consent of the
registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or
services . . . shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for any or
all of the remedies hereinafter provided . . . .52

The import of this change was to codify that federal trademark law
would no longer simply protect diversion of trade but rather, would also
protect trademark owners from those who veered too close to their mark.
Take, for example, “V-8” beverages and “V-8” vitamins. Under a
Borden’s Ice Cream formulation of trademark law, the maker of “V-8”
beverages would not succeed against a defendant who was making “V8” vitamins because the two products were not similar.53 However, under
the new Lanham Act provision, such a lawsuit was successful because
As part of the Court’s reasoning, Justice Breyer cited to PTO trademark registrations for the
shape of the Coca-Cola bottle, NBC’s three chimes, and the scent of plumeria flowers. Id.
51 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728, repealed by Lanham Act, ch. 540,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (emphasis added).
52 Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. at 437–38 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (2018)) (emphasis added).
53 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that there was
trademark infringement where the plaintiff, makers of the “V-8” beverage, brought suit against
defendants, who were making a “V-8” vitamin).
50
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direct competition was no longer needed but simply proof that there was
a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods. Professor
McKenna notes that the shift in the statutory language led courts to
further expand the idea of confusion and allow infringement claims
against any type of confusion that would associate the trademark owner’s
mark with another’s.54
The 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act continued this trend of
expansion of the idea of confusion by deleting the phrase “purchasers as
to the source of origin of such goods or services.”55 The current
formulation of the infringement standard in the Lanham Act is simply a
likelihood of confusion, regardless of the type of confusion.56 This has
led courts to interpret that many far-flung types of confusion, such as
post-sale confusion or initial interest confusion, can be actionable.57 This
is true even where such confusion is dispelled before any purchase or
sale, or even where the likelihood of confusion is not among potential
purchasers.58 Infringement claims that would have been dismissed prior
to these expansions for failure to state a claim under the relevant law are
now allowed under modern trademark law.
Another major expansion to trademark law through the Lanham Act
came in 1996 with the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
and then again in 2006 with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.59
Although the concept of dilution had been advocated by a prominent
scholar-practitioner at the time the debates of the Lanham Act were
swirling, a federal dilution law had not been adopted in 1946. 60 Instead,
McKenna, supra note 2, at 1902; see also Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721–25 (1999).
55 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 5:6 (quoting Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 2, 76 Stat.
769, 769).
56 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57 See Litman, supra note 54, at 1722 (“Courts have been generous in interpreting the scope of
confusion from which today’s credulous purchasers must be protected: Not only must they be
shielded from confusion about the source of a product at the point of sale, they must also be
protected from after-market confusion, reverse confusion, subliminal confusion, confusion about
the possibility of sponsorship or acquiescence, and even confusion about what confusion the law
makes actionable.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 769 (2012) (discussing post-sale confusion); Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 436–46 (2010) (discussing expansion of confusion doctrine);
Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005)
(discussing initial interest confusion).
58 See, e.g., Soter Techs., LLC v. IP Video Corp., No. 1:20-cv-05007, 2021 WL 744511, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (upholding initial interest confusion as a properly pled form of
confusion); City of New York v. Blue Rage, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(upholding post-sale confusion as an actionable form of confusion).
59 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1996).
Congress amended this act in 2006. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
60 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 821–
24 (1927). In addition, Mr. Schechter testified in favor of including an anti-dilution provision into
the new federal trademark law in 1932. A version of the law that included such a provision was
drafted but was not passed. See Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the
54
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a patchwork of state laws provided for heightened protection for
“famous” marks until the Lanham Act was officially amended to do the
same.61
Dilution provides a heightened level of trademark protection where
a trademark owner can prove that an unauthorized use is likely to dilute
its “famous” mark regardless of the relationship of product categories.62
One striking example of this is Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai
Motor America, where Louis Vuitton was able to obtain an injunction
against Hyundai Motor Company for including a Louis Vuitton-inspired
basketball in its car commercial.63 Even though the commercial showed
the basketball for only a second, the basketball had an imitation of the
famous Louis Vuitton “toile monogram” trademark on it.64 The court
found this sufficient to support a likelihood of dilution by blurring.65
Although fame is defined in a very specific manner by the Lanham
Act,66 this does not prevent trademark owners from claiming fame or
attempting to enforce dilution of their marks against others.67 In addition,
one of the statutory factors in the dilution analysis is whether the
trademark owner “exercises exclusive use of the marks.”68 The proof of
“exercising exclusive use” that is often accepted by courts is the
enforcement efforts by the trademark owner. For example, in the Louis
Vuitton case, the court cited with approval that “Louis Vuitton has set
forth evidence that in 2009, it ‘initiated’ 9,489 anti-counterfeiting raids
and 26,843 anti-counterfeiting procedures. In 2010, it sent 499 cease-anddesist letters in response to Customs Seizure Notices, after sending 217
such letters in 2009.”69 The court concluded that this was sufficient to
prove Louis Vuitton’s exclusive use.70 This acceptance by courts of such
Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 449–50 (1956).
61 See Derenberg, supra note 60, at 451–61 (discussing the state anti-dilution laws passed as of the
1950s and the developments in the law therein). See also Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 121, 125–26 (1996) (describing main differences between federal anti-dilution law and
state dilution statutes).
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
63 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 1:10-cv-01611, 2012 WL 1022247
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
64 Id. at *1.
65 Id. at *6–13.
66 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
mark’s owner.”).
67 See, e.g., Monster Energy Co. v. Li-Wei Chih, 2016 WL 740936 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (Monster
Energy claimed “fame” in product categories outside of energy drinks).
68 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii).
69 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 1:10-cv-01611, 2012 WL 1022247,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
70 Id. (“Based on the record, Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence supporting its exclusive use of
its marks, and Hyundai has failed to come forward with evidence that Louis Vuitton does not
maintain exclusive use of its marks.”). Another example of this is found in Lifeguard Licensing
Corporation’s enforcement efforts. See Declaration of Ruben Azrak at 4, Lifeguard Licensing Corp.
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enforcement activities incentivizes trademark owners to over-enforce
their marks as an avenue to fame and dilution protection.71
Altogether, these changes in federal trademark law through the
Lanham Act have expanded the scope of trademark protection far beyond
its historical focus on trade diversion. Given that trademark owners are
able to claim trademark protection over any form of mark and any form
of confusion, and they have a heightened reason to seek fame, it should
only be expected that trademark enforcement has increased since 1946.72
Trademark owners are increasingly incentivized by the statutory
provisions to do so. The recent Supreme Court interpretation of the
Lanham Act in Romag Fasteners has potentially amplified this trend.
Before addressing the impact of this decision, Part III will first connect
these changes in trademark law to incentives in trademark enforcement.
III. TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT AND STATUTORY INCENTIVES
When a trademark owner is considering whether to enforce their
trademark against a use they believe is unauthorized, there are many
factors at play. Depending on how the trademark is being used by the
third party (in a comparative commercial or parody), how the owner
discovered the infringement (via the legal department through its watch
service or via the sales department through irate retailers), and who the
allegedly infringing user is (a blogger or a competitor), the emotional
reaction and existing cognitive biases of the trademark owner will likely
be a major factor.73 Putting aside the emotions involved in making a legal
decision, other considerations include the costs of enforcement, existence
of legally plausible deterrents, the relative merits of one’s case, and the
benefits to such trademark enforcement.74 These latter two considerations
tie directly into the trademark changes discussed above.
A. Costs of Trademark Enforcement
Trademark enforcement can range from the very informal, such as
a phone call, to the informal, such as a cease-and-desist letter, to the

v. Kozak, 371 F. Supp. 3d 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:15-cv-08459) [hereinafter Azrak
Declaration] (claiming to have sent approximately 100 cease-and-desist letters to alleged
infringers).
71 Courts generally accept similar evidence in cases involving validity claims, which incentivizes
trademark owners to over-enforce, as well. See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting
the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791, 1834–42 (2007).
72 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 5:5–5:11.
73 See, e.g., Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in
Trademark Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 242 (2014) (discussing the
overvaluation of trademarks by their owners).
74 See William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 471–81 (2012) (discussing factors that attorneys
use when analyzing whether an enforcement in trademark and copyright cases is worth it).
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formal, such as an opposition or cancellation proceeding filed with the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB) at the PTO, all the way to
the very formal, such as a lawsuit filed with a federal district court.75 The
relative costs involved match the formality of the enforcement
mechanism. Depending on who is making the phone call, for example,
the in-house counsel or brand manager working at the trademark owner,
a phone call to the alleged infringer could be virtually costless.76 A ceaseand-desist letter may cost the trademark owner relatively nothing (if
drafted internally), or a few hundred dollars in billable time if services of
outside counsel are required, whereas litigation could cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars.77
While it is difficult to definitively document the myriad ways
enforcement happens, research suggests that the majority of trademark
enforcement happens informally.78 Additionally, there is evidence to
suggest that ex parte proceedings at the PTO (trademark oppositions of
pending trademark applications) and informal “letters of protest” are on
the rise as other avenues of enforcement.79 This means that trademark
litigation statistics that utilize filed lawsuits or the inter partes
proceedings in front of the TTAB are only a portion of the enforcement
taking place on a daily basis.80 And statistics that measure the reported
decisions of terminated lawsuits are likely an even smaller fraction of
trademark enforcement activity.81

See Grinvald, supra note 18, at 414–16 (discussing the cease-and-desist letter process); DEP’T
OF COM., TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT
TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT COUNTERFEITING 9–13 (2011), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default
75

/files/trademarks/notices/TrademarkLitigationStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL9H-D58L].
76 Many entities with large trademark portfolios have in-house legal departments, as well as brand
managers, who oversee their trademark enforcement. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP
Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1491, 1529 (2012).
77 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Two-Tiered Trademarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 322 (2018) (citing
the American Intellectual Property Law Association report on litigation costs); Brad Walz,
Breakdown of Trademark Infringement Litigation Costs, TRADEMARK BOB (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.trademarkbob.com/blog/trademark-litigation-costs/ [https://perma.cc/K57G-7KNA]
(breakdown of costs of taking a case to the TTAB).
78 See Grinvald, supra note 18, at 414; Gallagher, supra note 74, at 467 (concluding from
qualitative empirical work that most trademark cases settle).
79 See TTAB Incoming Filings and Performance Measures for Decisions, supra note 8; TMEP
§ 1715 (Oct. 2018) (“A letter of protest is an informal procedure created by and existing at the
discretion of the USPTO, whereby third parties may bring to the attention of the USPTO evidence
bearing on the registrability of a mark.”). The filing of these letters has almost doubled over the
course of two fiscal years, from 2,726 in FY 2017 to 4,106 in FY 2019. See Trademark Fee
Adjustment, 85 Fed. Reg. 73,197, 73,205 (Nov. 17, 2020). Based on this increase, the PTO has
begun to charge a fee for the filing of such letters. Id. at 73,198.
80 See Just the Facts: Intellectual Property Cases—Patent, Copyright, and Trademark, U.S. CTS.
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/02/13/just-facts-intellectual-property-casespatent-copyright-and-trademark [https://perma.cc/U65G-HK29]; TTAB Incoming Filings and
Performance Measures for Decisions, supra note 8.
81 See Gallagher, supra note 74, at 456.
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This evidence, combined with the likely strain on overall legal
budgets due to the COVID-19 pandemic,82 would appear to point to a
reasonable conclusion that trademark owners are utilizing less expensive
methods of trademark enforcement where possible. Based on this
conclusion, it is safe to infer that the costs of the majority of trademark
enforcement activities are likely fairly minimal, in relative terms, to an
overall legal budget of a large or well-resourced entity.83 Therefore, when
weighing whether to enforce one’s trademark against an allegedly
infringing use, the costs of such enforcement would not be a detraction
in such cost-benefit analysis. And, given that there are few deterrents that
would be likely to increase potential enforcement costs (discussed next),
it would appear that large entities are rarely disincentivized from doing
so.
B. Legally Plausible Deterrents
The factor that would add to the costs of trademark enforcement are
counter-mechanisms by which the targeted entity in the enforcement
action could fight back or statutory provisions that attempt to pose a
deterrent to unreasonable trademark claims. However, in the realm of
trademark enforcement, legally plausible deterrents (meaning those that
would be taken seriously as a deterrent) are few and far between. For
example, when a trademark owner sends a threatening or abusive ceaseand-desist letter,84 they are opening themselves up to a declaratory
judgment action filed by the target.85 One of the markers of a threatening
or abusive cease-and-desist letter is a seriously worded threat of legal
action against the recipient of the letter, which provides grounds for the
recipient to file suit first.86 However, while this is a legally plausible
occurrence, it is far from reality in many cases. Given this, it is likely not
considered a serious counter-mechanism by large trademark owners,
particularly where their targets are small businesses or individuals. 87

See, e.g., Nina Trentmann, Finance Chiefs Are on the Move as Pandemic Adds Strain, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/finance-chiefs-are-on-the-move-as-pandemic
-adds-strain-11597397401 [https://perma.cc/2WZ9-6F9Q].
83 See Grinvald, supra note 18, at 428.
84 See id. at 420−26 (defining an abusive cease-and-desist letter).
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any
court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”).
86 See Marta R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal
Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., 92 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 384 (2010) (“Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to
eliminate uncertainty in situations where one of the parties threatens to sue but does not
proceed. . . . Congress was especially mindful of the problems presented in patent, trademark, and
copyright infringement cases.” (footnote omitted)).
87 See Grinvald, supra note 18, at 441.
82

5. Grinvald ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

944

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

4/9/2022 11:08 AM

[Vol. 39:3

In addition, although the Lanham Act allows for a court to award
attorney’s fees and costs against plaintiffs who lose their lawsuits,88
courts do not often award them.89 The last sentence of Section 35(a) of
the Lanham Act states, “The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”90 This is identical to the
language of the Patent Act,91 which the Supreme Court interpreted in
2014 in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.92 In Octane,
the Court clarified that the “totality of the circumstances” of the case
should be considered, “in the rare case in which a party’s unreasonable
conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is
nonetheless so ‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of fees.”93 While this
somewhat more “lenient” standard (as compared to the prior
interpretation by the courts of this provision) has been applied to
trademark cases,94 in reality, it appears that courts are still not awarding
attorney fees where, arguably, they are warranted.95 Therefore, even
though the possibility of an attorney’s fee award has been cited as a
statutory provision that deters abusive litigation,96 the specter of paying
attorney’s fees is so low in trademark cases that it does not appear to serve
as a deterrent.97
C. Relative Merits of a Case
When analyzing the legal merits of a trademark case, consideration
is given to the statutory provisions, how courts have interpreted such
provisions, any legal defenses that defendants may have, as well as the
size of the target. The relative merits of one’s particular case are directly
related to the changes and expansions in trademark law described in Part
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
See Port, supra note 5, at 624.
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”).
92 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014).
93 Id. at 555.
94 See, e.g., Penshurst Trading Inc. v. Zodax LP, No. 1:14-cv-02710, 2015 WL 4716344, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (“[W]hether or not the Court applies the slightly more lenient standard set
forth in Octane Fitness to Plaintiffs [sic] Lanham Act claims, the Court concludes that this case is
not ‘exceptional’ as necessary to justify the award of attorneys’ fees.”), aff’d sub nom. Penshurst
Trading Inc. v. Zodax L.P., 652 F. App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2016).
95 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03419, 2018 WL
317850, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018) (holding that even though defendant’s bags were found to
be “obvious” parodies, Louis Vuitton’s legal arguments or enforcement behavior were not
“frivolous or a mere shakedown” (quoting Penshurst Trading, 652 F. App’x at 12)), aff’d, 764 F.
App’x 39 (2d Cir. 2019). See also Patrick H.J. Hughes, Louis Vuitton Should Pay for Suit Against
‘Obvious Parody,’ Professors Say, WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP., July 18, 2018, at 8.
96 See DEP’T OF COM., supra note 75, at 13 (“[T]he potential for an award of attorneys’ fees is an
existing deterrent to misuse of the litigation process in trademark disputes.”).
97 The “American” rule of each party paying their own legal fees is typically applied across
claimants. Professor Port’s research into decided trademark litigation cases shows that on the
whole, attorney’s fees are also not awarded very frequently. See Port, supra note 5, at 624.
88
89
90
91
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II. With statutory provisions having been expanded in favor of a
trademark plaintiff, it is fairly easy to put together a claim of trademark
infringement that can be “squeezed” through a crack.98 As long as a
trademark owner can somehow connect the defendant’s use of a
trademark to the owner, courts will consider the claim reasonable.99 In
addition, there is evidence to show that trademark owners can win their
lawsuits approximately fifty percent of the time,100 which, depending on
the trademark owner, may be a relatively good probability.101
Although there are a few statutory defenses that can assist a
defendant,102 these can only be of assistance when the enforcement matter
is brought to court. Where the matter stays extra-judicial, the statutory
defenses are unlikely to be persuasive, particularly in the case of
trademark bullying.103 The other factor that works hand-in-hand with the
inability to utilize statutory defenses is the size of the enforcement target.
Where the target is a small business or individual, they are unlikely to
afford an attorney who would be able to explain their legal position to
them. Or, if the target does have access to any legal assistance, the likely
advice will be to capitulate to the demands due to the inability of the small
business or individual to fight back.104 Therefore, in the realm of informal
legal dispute settlements, the statutory provisions and descriptions of
judicial interpretations of them are subject to the proponent’s narrative
and framing.105 For example, some cease-and-desist letters claim that if
the alleged infringer does not stop their activity, they will likely be
subjected to paying damages and attorney’s fees.106 As discussed above,
See, e.g., EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 3:12-cv-01011, 2014 WL
3726170, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014) (holding that unreasonable claims are those where no
party “could see an opening . . . through which the argument[s] could be squeezed”).
99 See id. Additionally, as Professor Jim Gibson notes, trademark licensing practices have
incrementally changed what is considered potentially confusing by consumers. See James Gibson,
Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907–23
(2007).
100 Port, supra note 5, at 631.
101 See Kiser, supra note 73, at 235–44 (discussing and applying prospect theory to trademark
owner decisions to enforce).
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2018). Scholars have also noted that these defenses are not as fulsome
as they need to be. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law,
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2009) (arguing for courts to adopt stronger affirmative trademark
defenses); Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a
“Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897 (2009) (arguing for statutory amendments to
encapsulate stronger trademark defenses); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use,
94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008) (arguing for a stronger fair-use defense).
103 See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 16, at 630–31.
104 See, e.g., GRPNY, Matt and “The Monster”—Rock Art Brewery vs. Monster Energy Drink,
YOUTUBE, at 2:38 (Oct. 14, 2009), https://youtu.be/kbG_woqXTeg (last visited Mar. 4, 2021)
(owner of a craft brewery relaying advice of his attorney to simply change the name of his beer
based on bullying from Monster Energy, despite the attorney acknowledging that no infringement
occurred).
105 See Gallagher, supra note 74, at 478.
106 See, e.g., Letter from Jason A. Champion, Counsel to Monster Energy Co., to Eric Klettlinger,
MPT Autobody 6 (Oct. 8, 2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20491792/2020-1098
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the probability that this is likely to happen is slim. But, where the target
is a small business or individual, this type of language is likely to be
persuasive.107 Even where the target takes a defensive posture and
declines to capitulate to the trademark owner’s demands, the enforcement
action is not detrimental to the owner. Simply taking action without
seeing any return can still be helpful, as is discussed below. Therefore,
taken altogether, a trademark owner’s relative merits of the case can
typically be interpreted as positive.
D. Benefits of Bringing an Enforcement Action
Another consideration in the analysis of whether to bring an
enforcement action is whether there are any benefits, such as favorable
treatment of one’s trademark or damage awards. Here, too, the
expansions in trademark law are directly in support. Given the expanded
protection for famous marks,108 along with the emphasis on “exclusive
control” over the mark, entities can benefit from over-enforcing their
marks.
Some entities utilize enforcement measures to build a foundation
upon which to claim they have a “famous” mark. A good example of this
is Monster Energy Company.109 Monster Energy Company is an energy
drink manufacturer that claims that its “Monster” and “M” marks are
famous and attempts to enforce its marks accordingly. It has brought
enforcement actions against many varied users of the terms “Monster”
and “M” and even users of the green and black colorway, the colors that
Monster Energy claims to have protectable trade dress in. 110 It continues
this enforcement strategy, notwithstanding that it does not have
registration for the mark “MONSTER” apart from “MONSTER
08-jvc-letter-to-klettlinger-hanb11868m.pdf [https://perma.cc/92WV-ELF4] (“MPT’s actions are
willful, intentional, and calculated to take advantage of Monster’s reputation and customer goodwill
in its valuable trademarks. The deliberate nature of this conduct may entitle Monster to claim
enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees in any action required to enforce its intellectual property
rights against MPT.”).
107 See Gallagher, supra note 74, at 478 (relaying that the small size of a target was a factor in favor
of bringing an enforcement action because threats were effective); Lemley, supra note 12, at 5;
Azrak Declaration, supra note 70, at 4 (claiming to have received more than a quarter of a million
dollars over the course of a decade arising out written settlements with alleged infringers).
108 See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Contracting Trademark Fame?, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1291,
1305–11 (2016) (discussing benefits of trademark fame); see also Monster Energy Co. v. Li-Wei
Chih, 2016 WL 740936, at *10 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (“When a prior user’s mark is found to be famous,
this plays a significant role in the likelihood of confusion analysis because famous marks enjoy a
broad scope of protection.”).
109 For a sampling of articles related to Monster Energy Company’s trademark enforcement
practices, see Search Results for Stories About “Monster Energy,” TECHDIRT, https://
www.techdirt.com/blog/?company=monster+energy [https://perma.cc/N2YZ-VJ3Z] (last visited
Mar. 18, 2021).
110 See, e.g., Monster Energy Co., 2016 WL 740936, at *3 (opposing trademark applications over
stylized “M” and the use of “Monster” as part of applicant’s “Monsterfishkeeper” mark); Letter
from Champion to Klettlinger, supra note 106 (claiming protectable trade dress in the green and
black combination).
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ENERGY,” nor does it have registered trade dress in just the green and
black colors.111 In addition, the TTAB has found that neither of its famous
marks are in fact famous outside of the energy drink market and that
“MONSTER” was not famous for purposes of dilution.112 But, if Monster
Energy can convince other entities to stop using its purported marks, over
time, it may obtain enough support that it has exclusivity, and therefore
fame, in product categories beyond energy drinks. This would qualify its
marks for the expanded protection under trademark infringement, as well
as for dilution protection.
In addition, in order to provide proof of “exclusive control,” entities
often submit their enforcement record, both informal and formal. For
example, in Louis Vuitton v. Hyundai, Louis Vuitton’s annual
enforcement record was used by the district court to support a finding that
Louis Vuitton had exclusive control over its “toile monogram” mark.113
During 2009, Louis Vuitton conducted 9,489 anti-counterfeiting raids,
was involved in 26,843 anti-counterfeiting procedures, and sent 217
cease-and-desist letters in response to receiving seizure notices from the
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agency.114 In 2010, it sent 499 such
letters.115 This was accepted as good evidence by the court at face value,
without further evidence as to whether any of the actions were successful
or any inquiry into whether there were any adverse judicial findings based
on these enforcement actions.116 This would seem to indicate that other
trademark owners could be similarly successful.
Further, a potential benefit of bringing enforcement actions is the
probability of recovering damages, defendant’s profits, or attorney’s fees,
Monster did have a trademark application, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87,925,577
(filed May 17, 2018) for “M MONSTER ENERGY,” which claims “The color(s) green, black,
silver, and white . . . as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of a stylized letter ‘M’ in the form
of a claw displayed in green above the stylized word ‘MONSTER’ which appears in the color white
with a silver outline, which is above the word ‘ENERGY’ which appears in the color green, all on
a black background.” But there is no registration or pending application for just the green and black
color combination by itself, as it claims in the letter to Mr. Klettlinger. See Letter from Champion
to Klettlinger, supra note 106, at 4 (“[G]iven MPT’s use of green and black and an emphasized,
stylized ‘M,’ there is a strong likelihood that potential customers viewing the MPT Logo will
mistakenly believe that there is some affiliation or connection with Monster, which is false.”).
112 Monster Energy Co., 2016 WL 740936, at *23. Granted, this finding of non-fame was as of
2010, which was the point at which Monster Energy’s marks needed to have been considered
famous for purposes of the opposition against “Monsterfishkeepers.” It could be that “MONSTER”
and “M” have become famous in the interim, but it should be noted that Monster Energy still does
not have any registered trade dress in simply green and black.
113 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 1:10-cv-01611, 2012 WL 1022247,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See id. (“Based on the record, Louis Vuitton has set forth evidence supporting its exclusive use
of its marks, and Hyundai has failed to come forward with evidence that Louis Vuitton does not
maintain exclusive use of its marks . . . .”). Note that Louis Vuitton does not win in all of its
enforcement matters. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 674 F. App’x
16 (2d Cir. 2016); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir.
2007).
111
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either through settlement with the alleged infringer or in a court award.
For example, some trademark owners include demands of attorney’s fees
in their cease-and-desist letters as a condition to settling the claim against
the recipient.117 While there are no statistics to document how often this
condition is fulfilled, given the near costless nature of such letters, even
if one recipient out of ten were to pay the demanded fees, this would be
a boon to the sender. For court awards, some evidence suggests that a
damage award in a successful lawsuit can average approximately
$738,000 for the plaintiff.118 Although the chances of prevailing in a
lawsuit are approximately 50%, the likelihood of obtaining a damages
award is approximately 5.5%.119 This low probability is likely a detractor
for some plaintiffs but may not be for others.120
One downside to over-enforcement may cause the balance of
benefits to sway the other way—the potential for shaming by the
trademark owner’s consumers or the broader public.121 In these days of
over-sharing on social media, it is easy for recipients of abusive ceaseand-desist letters to post them or share that they have received such
demands.122 Unfortunately, though, the prospect of shaming or being
labeled a “#trademarkbully” does not deter all entities, and additionally,
not all shaming is successful.123 Given that there are no provisions in the
Lanham Act that penalize entities for over-enforcing their marks, some
entities could see only benefits to enforcement. Post-Romag, these
benefits have potentially increased.
IV. ROMAG FASTENERS AND FUTURE ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVES
The Supreme Court has been quite active in weighing in on
trademark matters in the last few years. For historical perspective, from
1911 to 2011, the Supreme Court decided approximately forty trademarkrelated cases.124 By contrast, from 2011 to the present, the Supreme Court
has decided ten cases.125 The latest, Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil
See, e.g., Letter from Champion to Klettlinger, supra note 106, at 6.
See Port, supra note 5, at 624.
See id. at 631.
120 See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 797–817 (2003) (describing various forms of cognitive bias that
impact how clients and lawyers view litigation probabilities).
121 See generally Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 16 (discussing shaming as a non-judicial tool to
fighting back against trademark bullies).
122 See, e.g., Paul Martello, #Trademarkbully. . . Who Me? A Practical Guide for Attorneys on How
to Avoid the Label, 20 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 165 (2020).
123 See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 16, at 665–68 (describing the factors needed for success in
shaming); Kiser, supra note 73, at 232–44 (explaining why some entities bully).
124 See Edward Vassallo & Kristin B. Hogan, A Century of Supreme Court Trademark Law, 101
TRADEMARK REP. 113, 113 (2011).
125 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014); Pom Wonderful v. Coca-Cola, Co., 573 U.S. 102 (2014);
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418 (2015); B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
117
118
119

5. Grinvald ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

2021]

4/9/2022 11:08 AM

TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVES

949

Group, Inc., attempts to clarify when a successful plaintiff in a trademark
infringement lawsuit can obtain profits that accrued to the defendants
based on their infringing conduct.126 Prior to Romag, the circuit courts
were split as to whether a plaintiff had to prove that a defendant was
willful in its infringing conduct before a court could award defendant’s
profits to the plaintiff.127 Some circuits, like the Second Circuit, required
that willfulness be shown prior to such disgorgement of profits.128 Profits
were less likely to be awarded in the circuits that imposed this
requirement.129
The plaintiff in Romag—a “fastener” supplier to Fossil Group for
handbags—discovered that the manufacturers of the Fossil handbags
were using counterfeit Romag fasteners instead of authentic ones.130
Romag brought suit against Fossil and won on the issue of trademark
infringement at trial, with the jury awarding Romag profits under theories
of unjust enrichment and deterrence.131 But the jury did not find that the
defendants had acted “willfully,” and based on Second Circuit precedent,
the district court reversed the jury award of approximately $6.8
million.132 The only issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a
requirement of “willfulness” was a requirement for a court to award
defendant’s profits to a successful plaintiff.133
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that
“willfulness” is not such a requirement.134 The analysis in Romag shows
the importance of clear statutory text to the current Court. Although the
specific provision in the Lanham Act—Section 35 was all but the same
575 U.S. 138 (2015); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294
(2019); Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589 (2020); U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (2020); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v.
Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020).
126 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492.
127 Compare 4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. N.Y. & Co., 933 F.3d 202, 212–14 (2d Cir. 2019) (deeming
willfulness to be a prerequisite for profits), with Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson &
Co., 919 F.3d 869, 876 (5th Cir. 2019) (treating willfulness as one of six factors to be considered).
128 See, e.g., Pillar Dynasty LLC, 933 F.3d at 212–14; see also Pamela Samuelson, John M. Golden
& Mark P. Gergen, Recalibrating the Disgorgement Remedy in Intellectual Property Cases, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1999, 2008−23 (2020) (discussing the disgorgement rules in trademark law); Mark
A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 245, 254 (2010).
129 Thurmon, supra note 128, at 254.
130 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 91–94 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d, 817 F.3d
782 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017), and vacated in part,
686 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
131 Id. at 90. There were a number of other issues in the lower court cases including patent
infringement, as well as counterclaims of laches and unclean hands. Id. Although the plaintiff
apparently had evidence of the counterfeit snaps being used in May 2010, it did not fully investigate
the matter until October 2010, and then waited until “Black Friday” to file a temporary restraining
order (TRO) against Fossil. Id. at 93–95. The TRO neglected to include the history of the discovery.
Id. at 94–96.
132 Id. at 90, 112. The district court applied the Second Circuit’s precedent on this issue. Id. at 107.
133 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1494 (2020).
134 Id. at 1497.
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as when it was initially enacted in 1946, the Court inferred the same intent
from that language as it did with the language that was passed in 1996 for
a different form of infringement—dilution—under Section 43(c).135
According to Section 43(c), courts have the discretion to award profits to
a successful plaintiff if the defendant “willfully intended” to dilute the
plaintiff’s trademark.136 Although the language of Section 35 subjects the
decision to award profits to the principles of equity, the specific language
of Section 35 does not reference any level of mental state required before
courts could consider such an award.137 Therefore, the Court concluded
that “this Court [does not] usually read into statutes words that aren’t
there.”138
Instead, willfulness for a trademark infringement claim “is a
principle long reflected in equity practice where district courts have often
considered a defendant’s mental state, among other factors, when
exercising their discretion in choosing a fitting remedy.”139 While this
holding does not preclude the ability of courts to consider willfulness as
a prerequisite to an award of profits, it is relegated to but one factor courts
should take into account.140 This could mean, then, that profits can be
awarded even where a defendant is an “innocent infringer.”141 According
to Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, this is not consistent with the
principles of equity because, under equity, there were a wide range of
“culpable mental states.”142 However, these states did not include those
who acted in good faith nor those who were simply negligent.143 In
Romag, for example, while Fossil’s conduct did not necessarily rise to
Id. at 1495.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2018).
Id. § 1117(a) (“When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation
under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established . . . , the plaintiff shall be entitled,
subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs of the action.”). The original version of Section 35 is substantially the same as the current
version.
138 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1495.
139 Id. at 1497.
140 Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion on this point: “The relevant authorities, particularly
pre-Lanham Act case law, show that willfulness is a highly important consideration in awarding
profits under § 1117(a), but not an absolute precondition. I would so hold and concur on that
ground.” Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
141 See Samuelson et al., supra note 128, at 2015 n.91 (“Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion was
not averse to the idea of profits disgorgement in cases of innocent infringement, although it
recognized that a defendant’s mental state was a ‘highly important consideration’ in applying the
disgorgement remedy.”); see also Ben Wagner, Supreme Court’s Unanimous Decision in Romag
Fasteners Resolves Split on Trademark Infringers’ Profits, But Raises Questions, IP WATCHDOG
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/23/supreme-courts-unanimous-decisionromag-fasteners-resolves-split-trademark-infringers-profits-raises-questions/
[https://perma.cc/
57N3-33JX].
142 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1498 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
143 Id. (“Courts of equity, however, defined ‘willfulness’ to encompass a range of culpable mental
states—including the equivalent of recklessness, but excluding ‘good faith’ or negligence.”).
135
136
137

5. Grinvald ARTICLE (Do Not Delete)

2021]

4/9/2022 11:08 AM

TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT INCENTIVES

951

the level of being “willful,” the jury did find it acted with “callous
disregard.”144 This may or may not result in a profit award on remand,
particularly since the district court found Romag’s pre-trial behavior to
be sanctionable, which may neutralize the equities.145
While it is too early to know the full impact of Romag, the lack of a
requirement to prove defendants’ intentions before being awarded profits
may increase trademark enforcement efforts, and possibly even
incentivize them.146 Although Romag does not have any bearing on
whether plaintiffs will win more, the ruling increases the probability that
they would be awarded profits when they do win.147 This may increase
the benefits calculation for certain plaintiffs considering bringing formal
enforcement actions. While proving damages is fraught with difficulty,148
calculation of profits under Section 35 is written in favor of the
plaintiffs—plaintiffs only need to prove defendant’s sales. It is up to the
defendant to bring proof of how the sales relate to the infringing conduct
and which expenses should be deducted from the profits.149 While this
rule makes practical sense (defendants have better knowledge of their
overall business expenses and access to their receipts and other
documentation), this still tips the scale in favor of plaintiffs. The Court
acknowledged Fossil’s policy arguments—“that stouter restraints on
profits awards are needed to deter ‘baseless’ trademark suits”—could
have a point.150 But the Court punted the needed policy clarification over
to Congress.151

Id. at 1494 (majority opinion).
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 104–06 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d, 817
F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017), and vacated in
part, 686 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Samuelson et al., supra note 128, at 2022–23.
146 But see Eileen McDermott, Trademark Bar Cheers for ‘Good News in a Gloomy Time’ with
High Court’s Romag Fasteners Holding, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/23/trademark-bar-cheers-for-good-news-in-a-gloomy-time-with-highcourts-romag-fasteners-holding/ [https://perma.cc/KSJ4-2PNA] (compiling trademark practitioner
thoughts on the impact of Romag).
147 See Theodore H. Davis Jr., Joseph Petersen & Rita Weeks, The Supreme Court Abrogates
Willfulness as a Bright-Line Prerequisite for Accountings of Profits Under the Lanham Act,
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Insights/Alert
/2020/4/The-Supreme-Court-Abrogates-Willfulness-as-a-Bright-Line-Prerequisite-forAccountings-of-Profits-Under-the-Lanham-Act [https://perma.cc/FL5K-RZF4] (“A possible
accounting of its profits therefore can present a greater concern to a defendant accused of having
violated the Lanham Act than the risk of an award of the plaintiff’s actual damages.”).
148 See id. (“[A]lthough a prevailing plaintiff may receive an award of its actual damages upon a
showing of liability, proving the quantum of those damages can be difficult, especially if the
plaintiff cannot introduce evidence of a material amount of confusion or deception caused by the
defendant’s conduct.”).
149 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018) (“In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove
defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.”).
150 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1497 (2020) (“Maybe, too, each side has
a point.”).
151 Id. (“But the place for reconciling competing and incommensurable policy goals like these is
before policymakers. This Court’s limited role is to read and apply the law those policymakers have
ordained, and here our task is clear.”).
144
145
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In addition, this increase in the probability of being awarded profits
will assist trademark owners in their informal enforcement efforts.
Trademark owners will now be able to cite to Romag as good support
that, if the alleged infringer loses at a trial, profits will most likely be
awarded to the trademark owner.152 This will assist them in negotiating a
higher settlement amount because they can point to what a likely profit
award would be in the event the alleged infringer loses. Particularly
where the alleged infringer is in a non-competing field, this argument will
carry weight. Under the pre-Romag regime, damages in a case where the
defendant was in a non-competing field were extremely difficult to prove
and therefore, the specter of paying damages was low. But post-Romag,
non-competing defendants now have to worry about profit awards,
which, as mentioned above, are easier to prove for plaintiffs.
Finally, the increased probability in profit awards could incentivize
attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis to represent plaintiffs who
they may not have agreed to represent previously. Prominent trademark
practitioners have
opined that after
Romag, “Potential
defendants . . . should expect the risk of facing lawsuits in those circuits
[where willfulness had been required] to increase in the opinion’s wake,
including suits brought by contingency-fee counsel willing to roll the dice
on a monetary judgment.”153 Although contingency-fee-based attorney
assistance can provide needed access to legal counsel for those who
would not otherwise be able to afford it,154 it has the potential to
incentivize greater levels of enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Trademark law has greatly evolved from its origins as a narrow,
strict liability regime for direct trade diversion. It has expanded to protect
forms of marks, uses, and potential harms that are far beyond what
anyone could have imagined even in the early twentieth century. On its
diamond anniversary, the Lanham Act has provided for much of this
expansion through its statutory provisions. While much of trademark
enforcement these days has moved out of the courtroom and into the
realm of private dispute settlements, we should not forget that the
statutory provisions continue to incentivize such enforcement efforts. We
need to be cognizant that the harm of over-enforcement and bullying is
felt most by small businesses and individuals. Therefore, we need to

See, e.g., Letter from Champion to Klettlinger, supra note 106 (citing demands in cease-anddesist letter).
153 Davis et al., supra note 147.
154 See Angela Wennihan, Let’s Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 S.M.U. L.
REV. 1639, 1645–46 (1996) (describing history of contingency fees); John Leubsdorf, The
Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 477–78 (1981).
152
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continue the conversation around how to alleviate this harm, whether
through encouraging different judicial or regulatory interpretation or
through further statutory reform.

